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CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, STRUCTURED SECURITIES,
AND THEWAY OUT OF THE ABYSS
LOIS

R. LUPICA 1

Bear in mind, however, that a rating is, in the end, an opznzon. The
rating assignment is as much an art as it is a science. 2

L

Credit Rating Agencies and Credit Ratings

Since the early twentieth century, credit rating agencies
("CRAs") have provided opinions about the creditworthiness of
securities issuers and the quality of their issuances. 3 An issuer's
creditworthiness is a function of the risk that its loan instrument will
1

Maine Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Maine School of
Law. B.S. Cornell University, 1981; J.D. Boston University School of Law,
1987.
2
STANDARD & POOR'S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 3 (2008)
(statement of Solomon B. Samson, Chief Rating Officer, Corporate
Ratings).
3
Standard & Poor's ("S&P") stated that
[a] Standard & Poor's issuer credit rating is a current
opinion of an obligor's overall financial capacity (its
creditworthiness) to pay its financial obligations. This
opinion focuses on the obligor's capacity and willingness
to meet its financial commitments as they come due. It
does not apply to any specific financial obligation, as it
does not take into account the nature of and provisions of
the obligation, its standing in bankruptcy or liquidation,
statutory preferences, or the legality and enforceability of
the obligation. In addition, it does not take into account
the creditworthiness of the guarantors, insurers, or other
forms of credit enhancement on the obligation. The issuer
credit rating is not a recommendation to purchase, sell, or
hold a financial obligation issued by an obligor, as it does
not comment on market price or suitability for a particular
investor.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, Issuer Credit Rating Definitions,
(last visited Mar.
26, 2009).
http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ ABS/sandpratings.htm

HeinOnline -- 28 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 639 2008-2009
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decline in value as a result of its failure to satisfY the contractual
terms of its borrowing arrangement. 4 Although the pronouncements
of CRAs have enormous consequences for the financial markets,
issuers and investors, until quite recently CRAs have operated
largely unnoticed in the shadows of these markets. 5
This obscurity ended with the relatively recent
transformation of the financial markets. As increasing numbers of
business borrowers began entering the securitization market
financing their operations by securitizing their assets rather than by
accessing more traditional sources of finance-the financial markets'
landscape
became
dramatically
and
inexorably
altered.
Technological innovation coupled with financial wizardry fueled the
rapid growth of the securitization markets, leading to increasingly
high volume conversions of cash flows into complex securitized and
collateralized debt instruments and their derivatives. 6 A self

4

See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL:
AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF
CREDITWORTHINESS 4 (2005) ("The higher the rating, the less [the] risk of
default on repayment to the lender ....").
5
!d. at 1-2 ("Their arsenal is an occult one, largely invisible to all but a few
most of the time.").
6
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated the
following regarding technological innovation:
The impact of information technology has been keenly
felt in the fmancial sector of the economy. Perhaps the
most significant innovation has been the development of
financial instruments that enable risk to be reallocated to
the parties most willing and able to bear that risk. Many of
the new fmancial products that have been created, with
fmancial derivatives being the most notable, contribute
economic value by unbundling risks and shifting them in a
highly calibrated manner. Although these instruments
cannot reduce the risk inherent in real assets, they can
redistribute it in a way that induces more investment in
real assets and, hence, engenders higher productivity and
standards of living. Information technology has made
possible the creation, valuation, and exchange of these
complex financial products on a global basis.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Revolution in Information
Technology, Remarks Before the Boston College Conference on the New

2009

CREDIT RATING AGENCIES & STRUCTURED SECURITIES

641

reinforcing supply and demand cycle emerged, with investment
banks and other participants in the securitized debt market creating a
seemingly insatiable demand for the sale of asset-backed securities
("ABSs"), mortgage-backed secuntles ("MBSs"), and other
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"). 7
With this insatiable demand for derivative instruments,
investors correspondingly demanded accurate and timely information
about the risks associated with investment in these securities.
Accordingly, CRAs developed methodologies, models, and processes
of analysis in order to provide opinions with respect to investment
risks in these derivatives.
During the securitization boom, CRAs' volume of business
expanded ten-fold, and they, like all other financial market
participants, became caught up in its exuberance. 8 The high volume
of issuances, long runs of high yields, and the complexity of the
investments all led to widespread over-dependence of investors on
rating agencies to evaluate risk. 9 With the benefit of hindsight, it is

Economy (Mar. 6, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2000/20000306.htm).
7
!d. (partially attributing the rise in the supply and demand of securitized
fmancial instruments to the capacity of such instruments to redistribute risk
in novel ways).
8
Discussing the meltdown of the structured finance market, The Economist
stated:
Alongside the banks, the "gatekeepers" who were
supposed to lend stability and credibility to the new
originate-and-distribute model of finance have also been
found wanting. Rating agencies' models underplayed the
risk that loans from different lenders and regions could
turn sour at the same time. Bond insurers, too, misjudged
the risks lurking in CDOs. That failing has undermined
the worth of their guarantees and strained their own credit
ratings-and hence financial markets.

Fear and Loathing, and a Hint of Hope, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2008,
available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id
=10689043.
9
!d. (discussing the "breakneck growth" of securitization, and identifying
such underlying flaws as "the sheer lack of understanding of some
instruments" and "the market's over-reliance on ratings as a short cut to
assessing risk").
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clear that such unbridled confidence in rating agencies' opinions was
. 1ace d . 10
m1sp
In 2008, the financial markets collapsed, and rating agencies
were caught in the "conflagration." 11 The failure of the financial
markets, attributed to "the collective misjudgment of risk; a zealous
search for yield; and the failure of oversight," 12 has served to shine a
spotlight on the activities of CRAs and to raise questions about the
nature and scope of their authority and the financial implications of

10

There were individuals, however, who recognized the large level of risk
in the securitization market, even when the market was at its peak. See, e.g.,
Frederic Dannen, The Failed Promise of Asset-Backed Securities,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1989, at 261 (observing that market prices
for ABS have not always been an accurate reflection of their credit
enhanced quality); Gary Silverman, Debra Sparks & Andrew Osterland, A
$2.5 Trillion Market You Hardly Know, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 123
(observing that there is an "illusion of liquidity" in the ABS market which is
leading to more expensive credit for originators, who in tum are passing the
higher costs on to consumers); Gary Silverman, Commentary: Securitization
is No Security Blanket, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 140 (finding that banks
are securitizing safe loans and keeping the risky ones, thereby masking their
true insolvency probability); Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls?,
Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64 (quoting a rating agency managing director
urging caution to ABS investors).
11
The Economist eloquently described the situation:
How do you fight a conflagration when smaller blazes
erupt almost daily? ... Though the crisis is far from over,
its causes have long been clear. Securitisation-the
packaging of bank loans into tradable bonds-grew too
complex. The incentives of those involved, especially loan
originators, were warped. Lending standards plummeted
as a result, not only in mortgages but in credit cards and
corporate lending too. Investors over-reached for yield as
interest rates fell. Everyone focused on credit ratings
rather than the underlying credits. . . . Credit-rating
agencies will be expected to distinguish more clearly
between ratings for structured products and straight
corporate debt, and to flag up conflicts of interest.
Dousing the Fire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.
economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=I0855889.
12
Barbarians at the Vault, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2008, at 17.
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their judgments. 13 The high profile incidences of CRAs "getting it
wrong" have further triggered calls for greater scrutiny and oversight
.
.
14
over the1r operatiOns.
The deregulatory efforts of recent years have opened up new
opportunities and prospects for many participants in the financial
markets, including rating agencies. 15 However, this shifting
landscape has also resulted in new disquiet and uncertainty, with
initial unease evolving into fundamental questions about the
legitimacy of the essentially unregulated credit rating industry. 16

13

Until a few decades ago, credit rating was a stagnant business, offering
little information beyond that which was already publicly available. Frank
Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers 63 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Stud. Res. Paper
available
at
Series,
Research
Paper
No.
07-46,
2006),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257 ("The rating business remained stagnant
for decades."). Rating adjustments tended to lag behind by almost 18
months and were commonly reflective of information already incorporated
into stock prices. !d. ("According to a study of 207 corporate bond rating
changes from 1950 to 1972, credit rating changes generated information of
little or no value. The changes merely reflected information already
incorporated into stock market prices-and indeed lagged that information
by as much as eighteen months.").
14
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 149-73 (describing a number of high profile
rating debacles in a chapter entitled "Blown Calls"). As Senator Lieberman,
Chair of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, observed:
[T]he credit rating agencies were dismally lax in their
coverage of Enron. They didn't ask probing questions and
generally accepted at face value whatever Enron officials
chose to tell them. And while they claim to rely primarily
on public filings with the SEC, analysts from Standard &
Poor's not only did not read Enron's proxy statement,
they didn't even know what information they might
contain.
Press Release, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector
Watchdogs (Oct. 8, 2002).
15
See JACOBS. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC
INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 3-5 (2008).
16
!d. (arguing that Americans are bearing increasingly greater economic
risks).
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Particularly in light of the credit market's information asymmetries,
the public's confidence in CRAs has been called into question. 17
This article examines the role of credit rating agencies in the
evolving financial markets. The movement away from relationship
based lending sited on trust to the less personal and more distensive
capital markets made an objective assessment of creditworthiness
essential to structure legitimate financial transactions, as well as to
evaluate the credibility of investor decision-making. As CRAs have
devoted a greater share of their resources to develop methods of
rating these progressively more exotic securities, their dedicated
influence over the organization of and participation in the capital
markets has grown exponentially, thus making the issue of the
accuracy of credit ratings and the accountability of CRAs ever-more
critical. 18

IL

The Emergence ofthe Securitization Market

Driven by bankers, speculators, traders, lawyers,
accountants, investors, CRAs and other participants, the financial
markets have experienced a massive transformation in virtually every
respect over the past decade and a half. 19 Advanced information
17

Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke observed that
since August, mortgage lenders, commercial and
investment banks, and structured investment vehicles have
experienced great difficulty in rolling over commercial
paper backed by subprime and other mortgages. More
broadly, a loss of confidence in credit ratings led to a
sharp contraction in the asset-backed commercial paper
market as short-term investors withdrew their funds ....

Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Liquidity Provision by the
Federal Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial
Markets Conference (May 13, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www .federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080513 .htm).
18

U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF

CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

5 (Jan. 2003) (" [T]he importance of [credit rating agency] opinions to
investors and other market participants, and the influence of these opinions
on the securities markets, have increased significantly ....").
19

DANIEL

J. BOORSTTN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE

55-56,204-05,210-11,419 (1973) (chronicling the emergence in the mid
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systems 20 have led to the emergence of the securitization market in
which public and private investors are able to purchase wide arrays
of innovative investment products. 21 These investment products
include complex securitized assets and derivatives backed by
mortgage loans, 22 credit cards, and other consumer-credit
receivables. 23

nineteenth century of CRAs in response to wholesalers' need for reliable
credit rating information, which emerge from practices such as the use of
lawyers in the west to investigate local businesses for credit worthiness, the
ever expanding complexity of accounting in the industrial age, the
development of Certified Public Accountants in response to new forms
taxation, and the development of new forms of incorporation and
investment trusts).
20
See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The Impact of

Technology on Banking: The Effect and Implications of "Deconstruction"
of Banking Functions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 135, 136-40 (2001)
(describing the role of technology in the bank deconstruction phase of the
1990s).
21
Securitization, or structured finance, is a process whereby an entity pools
together its interests in identifiable cash flows and then sells them to
investors in the form of securities. These cash flows can be sold with or
without collateral support. The securitizing entity initially sells its cash
flows to a Special Purpose Corporation, commonly referred to as an SPC,
which then in turn, transforms these cash flows into securities. The
securities, backed by the cash flows (asset-backed securities or ABS, or
mortgage-backed securities or MBS) are then sold to private or public
investors. A firm can originate a securitization transaction only if it has
earnings in the form of cash flow from long- or medium- term obligations
owed to it by what are known as account debtors. See generally
SECURTTTZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1997
& Supp. 2008) (explaining the structure of securitization transactions);
JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT:
INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988) (describing
securitization as a method of finance).
22
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") states that
[MBSs] are debt obligations that represent claims to the
cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly
on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased
from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators
and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi
governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues
securities that represent claims on the principal and

646

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 28

The securitization market was born in 1970 with the first
24
mortgage-backed security issuance. Non-real-estate public-asset
backed security issuances took off in the mid 1980s, when the

interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the
pool, a process known as securitization.
U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
23
SYLVAIN RAYNES & ANN RUTLEDGE, THE ANALYSTS OF STRUCTURED
SECURITIES: PRECISE RISK MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION vii
(2003) (describing structured securities, which include asset-backed
securities, as "debt securities backed by the pooled receivables of existing
loans, leases, trade fmancings, bonds, or other fmancial assets whose credit
risk generally has been de linked from the credit of the originator or seller by
sale, swap or assignment."); see also Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:
The Unsecured Creditors' Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REv. 595, 660 (1998)
[hereinafter Lupica, Asset Securitization]; Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of
the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization ofSecuritization,
33 CoNN. L. REV. 199, 208-230, 236-240 (2000). In January 1989, the non
seasonally adjusted outstanding pool of securitized assets from revolving
and non-revolving consumer loans was $802,841,790,000. In April 2006,
that same pool of securitized assets was valued at $2,292,839,490,000.
Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, Consumer Credit Historical Data,
Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/cc_hist_mt.
html.
24
The following excerpt illustrates the history:
[t]he first MBS was brought to market by Ginnie Mae in
1970. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the major
type of MBS security was the pass-through security ... A
major innovation for the MBS market occurred in 1983
when Freddie Mac issued the first Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). These new instruments
appealed to investors with special maturity and cash-flow
requirements. However, the first CMO issues faced
complex tax, accounting and regulatory obstacles. Much
of those legal issues were resolved with the passing of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included the Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) tax vehicle. After
1986 the issuance of CMOs grew enormously.
IVO KOLEV, FINANCIAL POLICY FORUM DERIVATIVES STUDY CENTER,
PRIMER: MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (2004), http://www.financial
policy .org/fpfprirnermbs.htm.
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increasing use of computers in the financial services sector enabled
the funds tracking and analysis that enabled the pooling and
redistributions of income-generating loans. 25 Since the early days of
these markets, the volume of issuances has grown exponentially. 26 In
2006, the approximate combined market for ABSs and CDOs was
between $10.7 and $12.7 trillion. 27 At its market peak, securitization
was hailed as "one of the most significant financial innovations in the
global capital markets during the past 15 years." 28 Commentators
once believed that securitization would forever continue to "evolve

25

Lowell L. Bryan, Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology
for Lending, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1988, at 10-11 (describing Franklin
Savings' $100 million securitization of government loans). This issuance
was followed by a deal originated by General Motors Acceptance
Corporation in 1986.ld.
26
See Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, supra note 23.
27
Matt Miller, Chain of Fools, THE DEAL, Oct. 3, 2008,
http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/features/chain-of-fools.php.
28
Adam Reinebach, As Franchise Loan Industry Expands, Securitization
Deals are Following, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., May 1 I, 1998, at 13
(forecasting that the franchise asset class will significantly expand in the
next years); Adam Reinebach, The Outlook for ABS is So Rosy That It's
Scary, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June I, 1998, at 26 (describing the
securitization of intellectual property futures, utility losses, and reinsurance
risk while stating that the rapid growth of securitization is a result of a
combination of low and stable interest rates and good economic conditions);
Matthew Schifrin & Howard Rudnitsky, Rx for Receivables, FORBES, May
6, 1996, at 52 (describing the securitization of pharmaceutical receivables);
Suzanne Wooley & Stan Crock, You Can Securitize Virtually Everything,
Bus. WK., Jul. 20, I 992, at 78 ("Few financial innovations have been more
of a bonanza to Wall Street than asset-backed securities."); Michael
Gregory, SG Cowen Brings First Rights Deal, STRUCTURED FINANCE
NEWS, Mar. 13, 2000, http://www.structuredfinancenews.com/issues/
2000_1 1/161855-l.html?type=printer_friendly (describing the securitization
of a sports stadium naming rights contract); Standard & Poor's: US. Asset
Backed Securities Market Will Continue Expansion, PRNEWSWIRE, Feb. 10,
2000 (statement of Dr. Joseph Hu, head of the Standard & Poor's Structured
Finance research team, that asset securitization is one of the greatest
innovations in the last decade and a halt); see also Kim Clark, On the
Frontier of Creative Finance, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, at 50 (describing
trends in securitization); Ron J. Feldman, Senior Vice President, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Will the Securitization Revolution Spread?
(Sept. 1995), http://www.minneapolisfed .org/research/pub_ display.cfm
?id=3684 (describing securitization as a "profound change in banking").
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and expand." 29 Standard & Poor's ("S&P") observed during the
1990s that securitization's continued attractiveness to investors was
due to the high quality and stability of the issued assets? 0
To be sure, securitization has offered myriad benefits to
many financial market participants. 31 Securitized and derivative
financial products have allowed both financiers and investors to
hedge market and currency risk while simultaneously meeting the
goals of financial institutions to borrow cheaply, transfer and
diversify risk, access new sources of capital, and take advantage of
economies of scale. 32 It has also resulted in unprecedented profits
booked by participants in the financial markets 33 -including rating
.
34
agencies.
29

Stephen L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 133, 134-141 (1994) (describing the process and uses of
securitization and referring to securitization as "alchemy"); Greenspan,
supra note 6; Debra Sparks, Bad Loans Made Good, Bus. WK., Oct. 26,
1998, at 12, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1998/43/b3601155;
Standard & Poor's, supra note 28 ("'Asset securitization is one of the most
significant financial innovations in the global capital markets during the past
15 years,' says the report's author, Dr. Joseph Hu .... 'Not only will the
issuance volume expand, but the variety of underlying assets and innovative
structures will also grow."').
30
Shane Kite, Insiders' Predictions Point to Maturing Market, Oct. 18,
1999,
http://www .structuredfmancenews.com/issues/1999_ 421161611-1.
html; Standard & Poor's: US. Asset-Backed Securities Market Will
Continue Expansion, supra note 28; Akil Salim Roper, ABS Market
Expected to Grow in 1999, 17 PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER 2, 2 ( 1999).
31
See, e.g., Schwarcz supra note 29, at 136, 146-54 (describing the benefits
securitization offers issuers, including providing a source of off-balance
sheet funding and reducing net financing costs).
32
Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 23, at 605; see also RAYNES &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 23, at vii.
33
Banking profitability began reaching record highs at the turn of the
millennium. Condition and Performance of Commercial Banks, U.S.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: QUARTERLY J., Dec.
1999, at 1, available at http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qu3 887I
is_l99912/ai_n8863440. In the three months ending September 30, 1999,
banks reported $19.4 billion in net income, a record level. !d. Both return on
assets and return on equity in the banking industry as a whole had also
reached record levels. !d.
34
See, e.g., Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Mar. 2,
2009) (depicting that Moody's Corp. earnings were higher than that of its
peer groups as well as the S&P 500 composite index).
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While minimizing risk and making money is what the
finance industry does (rewards are meted out based on who does this
35
best), with escalating profits comes the risk of complacency.
Bankers and CRAs fell into this complacency by failing to recognize
and address some of securitization's fault lines and failings in the
36
market's operation. A central failing of the market is directly tied to
37
the "too-clever-by-half'
structure of many of these complex
transactions: few truly understood these transactions, the nature of
the investments being sold, and how to evaluate the risk associated
with the underlying assets. 38
We now know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the full
39
measure of risk was not captured or reflected in the ratings in this
35

With the creation of a robust secondary market for loans, in turn resulting
in enormous balance-sheet flexibility, securitization has accounted for 20 to
30 percent of investment banks' profits. Fear and Loathing, supra note 6, at
77.
36
What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.economist.
com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1 0881318.
37
As The Economist observed,
[t]here is a growing consensus that loose credit and too
clever-by-half financial wizardry sowed the seeds of
America's still-deepening economic malaise. One practice
in particular has been singled out for censure-the
bundling of loans into assets that could be sold on to
investors. The charge is that by breaking the link between
those who vet borrowers and those who bear the cost
when they default, securitisation led to the lax lending that
both fuelled and felled America's housing market.

Chain of Fools, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.economist.com/
finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10641119.
38
The SEC released findings in the summer of 2008, after an "extensive I 0
month examinations of three major credit rating agencies," indicating
"significant weaknesses in ratings practices and the need for remedial action
by the firms to provide meaningful ratings and the necessary levels of
disclosure to investors." Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Examinations Find Shortcomings in Credit Rating Agencies' Practices and
Disclosures to Investors (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2008/ 2008-135.htm.
39
The central risks facing investors purchasing MBSs and ABSs are the
credit quality of the underlying receivables, the value of the underlying
collateral (if collateralized), the issuers' operational risks, uncertainty in
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market. 40 Appreciating and accurately valuing the assets supporting
ABSs and MBSs is fundamental to any risk assessment. 41 In the
governing law, and the bankruptcy of the issuer. The S&P websites states
that the Servicer Evaluation review process includes "Management and
Organization; Internal Controls; Historical Portfolio Performance; Cash
Management; Organizational Efficiency; [and] Loan Asset/Administration."
Standard & Poor's, Servicer Evaluations, http://www2.standardandpoors.
com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/ratings_sf_ se/2, I ,9,6,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
O,O.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). S&P conducts analysis with respect to
ABS services with "a dedicated team of analysts assess[ing] a wide range of
a servicer's business practices .... through on-site meetings and analyses of
company materials and data, summarizing in a report its findings and
recommendations.").
40
If a debtor in bankruptcy has securitized a portion of its assets, its trustee
will be concerned with any and all vulnerabilities presented by the
transaction's structure, as well as the extent to which its contractual
agreements are enforceable under the law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000). If
even one element of the transaction is vulnerable to challenge, the ABS
investors' return on its investment will be compromised. Accordingly, the
degree of risk to which ABS investors are subject is in large part a factor of
the successful structuring of the bankruptcy-remote transaction. A
bankruptcy-remote transaction structure isolates the special purpose entity
("SPE") from the effects of the securitizing debtor's bankruptcy. This is
accomplished by (i) ensuring that the asset transfer meets the judicial test of
a "true sale;" (ii) providing for the SPE's separateness, so that a court will
not substantively consolidate the SPE and the originator; and (iii)
compliance with relevant legal formalities, such a perfection of security
interests, and due organization of each entity under applicable law. A
bankruptcy-remote transaction structure is one that also protects SPE
investors from the SPE's potential bankruptcy. To minimize the chance of
an SPE's insolvency, transaction sponsors commonly include a variety of
pre-petition bankruptcy waivers, or "hindrance mechanisms" in an SPE's
organizational documents. Examples of these hindrance mechanisms
include (i) provisions in the SPE' s organizing documents, limiting its
purpose and activities; (ii) limitations on the SPE's indebtedness; (iii)
guarantees that become effective upon the occurrence of an entity's
bankruptcy; (iv) provisions in charter documents that require unanimous
consent of all managers, in order to file for bankruptcy; (v) an agreement by
the debtor that a bankruptcy filing would be in "bad faith"; (vi) an
agreement by the debtor to waive the terms of the automatic stay, pre
petition; and (vii) an agreement by the debtor to seek court abstention, upon
a filing for bankruptcy. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its
Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1564-80; Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles,
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absence of a precise understanding and valuation of securitized
assets, the exercise in arbitrage fails, and the credit rating becomes
based upon a misunderstanding that in turn determines the faulty
MBS, ABS, or CDO pricing. 42 This has the potential to lead to
further failings in the fundamental structuring of transactions, with,
for example, senior tranches' fallibility far greater than their rating
(and pricing) suggests. 43

Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 9-10, 35-36 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11190, 2005).
S&P has also stated that bankruptcy-remote transaction structuring
is always a large factor in overall SPE structure: "At the heart of every
structured finance transaction is a vehicle designed to protect investors in
the event of a bankruptcy. The credibility of these bankruptcy-remote
vehicles and the criteria by which their levels of risk are measured stand as
the foundation oftoday's structured finance market."
Poor's-Ratings, Structured Finance, http://www2.
Standard &
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page. family /ratings_sf/2, 1,9 ,0,0,0
,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
41
See generally Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future
Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318
(2000) (providing background information on the process of securitization);
Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 23, at 595 (describing the risks
associated with securitization); RAYNES & RUTLEDGE, supra note 23;
Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 134-41 (detailing the process and benefits of
asset securitization).
42
The press release describing the SEC report on rating agency performance
noted that
[t]he SEC staff's examinations found that rating agencies
struggled significantly with the increase in the number
and complexity of subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations
(CDO) deals since 2002. The examinations uncovered that
none of the rating agencies examined had specific written
comprehensive procedures for rating RMBSs and CDOs.
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 38; see also U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
36-37 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/cra
examination070808.pdf.
43
As the SEC states in its report,
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Whether the financial modeling tools developed to quantity
the risk of investing in these securitized and derivative products were
.
1ete, 44 fl awe d,45 or oth erw1se
. ma
. dequate, 46 or w h eth er the
mcomp
rating agencies, blinded by extraordinary profits 47 and conflicts of
interest, 48 ignored the risks revealed by these models is not yet clear.
What has become clear, as the CRAs have tried to dust themselves
[a] key step in the process of creating and ultimately
selling a subprime RMBS and COO is the issuance of a
credit rating for each of the tranches issued by the trust
(with the exception of the most junior "equity" tranche).
The credit rating for each rated tranche indicates the credit
rating agency's view as to the creditworthiness of the debt
instrument in terms of the likelihood that the issuer would
default on its obligations to make interest and principle
payments on the debt instrument.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 7.
It is clear that rating agencies gave high ratings to subprime-mortgage
securities that subsequently sank in value, and then reacted slowly as
defaults rose. The Role ofCredit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises ofthe H. Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Cong. 49-50 (2007) (examining the extent to which credit rating
agencies contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis).
45
See note 42 and accompanying text.
46
CRAs' ratings either did not accurately reflect such risks at the time of
issue, or lagged behind once circumstances changed. Rating the Raters:
Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, I 07th Cong. 44 (2002) (statement of Jonathan R.
Macey, Professor of Law) (examining the failure of rating agencies in
predicting Enron's collapse).
47
Anatomy of a Deal, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 128-29, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/43/b360 I 156.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2009) (stating that "[s]ecuritization is a money machine" for mortgage
brokers, finance companies, investment bankers and institutional investors).
In the past years, for example, Moody's earnings rose over 375%, largely as
a result of the proliferation of structured fmance deals. Partnoy, supra note
13, at 65-67. Until very recently, structured finance transactions accounted
for 43 percent of Moody's revenues. !d. at 60.
48
Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As Housing Boomed, Moody's Opened
Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1 I, 2001, at A I (detailing the changes in institutional
culture at Moody's that may have led to conflicts of interest, as Moody's
officials became more socially connected to investment bankers by making
themselves more accessible and accepting social invitations).
44
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off and repair both their balance sheets and their reputations, is that
there are specific points of systemic failure in their rating
49
methodology, analysis, organization, and processes.

IlL

The Influence ofCredit Ratings

Credit Rating Agencies are private organizations performing
50
a quasi-public function. Since the early twentieth century, investors

49

The following is S&P's description of its decision to review its method of
rating collateralized debt obligations:
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services announced in
a recent article that it is conducting a comprehensive
review of all assumptions and methodologies it uses to
assign ratings to corporate synthetic collateralized debt
obligation (COO) transactions ....As a first step in the
review, Standard & Poor's examined the global corporate
synthetic COOs it rates to identify any systemic
concentration risks in this sector. The article notes that
this sector as a whole generally appears to have
considerable exposure to 100 global corporate issuers.
While the high rate of name overlap among these
portfolios does not make any individual portfolio riskier
than another, the sector could see an increase in
downgrades if these 100 names experience negative rating
migration.
"In our analysis, we identified a number of key
risks we saw for corporate synthetic COOs. These
include: collateral performance, such as default/credit
events, rating transition, sector correlation, and recovery
rates; counterparty jump to default risk; and widening
CDS spreads," credit analyst Belinda Ghetti said.
"As a result of our review, we will likely look for
more credit enhancement for all rating categories, and
adjust our ratings on outstanding corporate synthetic
CDOs.... In the interim, Standard & Poor's is committed
to promoting transparency in the corporate synthetic COO
market. ..." Ms. Ghetti stated.
Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Advance Notice of Criteria Change for
Corporate Synthetic COO's Published (Jan. 12, 2009).
50
Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916,
934 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
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and regulators have looked to CRAs to evaluate the creditworthiness
of an obligor or a securities issuer. While their ostensible function is
to address information asymmetries inherent in many public debt
finance transactions, in practice, their judgments about issuers and
issuances goes beyond a mere evaluation of credit. The internal
policies of CRAs in developing ratings criteria have the effect of
"adjust[ing] the 'ground rules' inside international capital markets,
thereby shaping the internal organization and behavior of institutions
seeking funds." 51 The criteria developed and operationalized by
ratings agencies influence the level of activity of the finance markets,
the allocation of capital, as well as the cost of credit. 52 Until recently,
financial markets generally considered the pronouncements of CRAs
to be both trustworthy and authoritative.
Very few rating agencies, however, hold this authority. Iftoo
much power and influence is held by too few institutions and if these
few institutions have exclusive access to too much information about
securities and issuers, the potential for competition is thwarted, and
behavior corrupted. Currently, only three CRAs qualify as Nationally
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations ("NRSRO"): Moody's,
S&P, and Fitch. Qualification as an NRSRO requires a certain
amount of ratings volume, a substantial track record and recognition
in the market. 53 An agency's reputation is developed over many years
by rating a multitude of types of issuers and issuances. Thus, the
NRSRO designation and the structure and function of the market act
as a barrier to entry. 54 The influence of the few NRSROs goes even
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 302
(2004); Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 742 (2004).
51
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 15.
52
Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating
Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, in CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES: NEED FOR REFORM TN CANADA?, at 14 (Capital Markets Institute
Policy Series, Aug. 2005) ("Through their activities, [CRAs] influence the
conditions under which issuers will have access to debt markets, the
conditions of their relationships with lenders, and the structure of their
transactions.").
53
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of2006, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7 (2008).
54
The imperfectly competitive market is further exacerbated by the essential
nature of a rating agency's reputational capital. Rating the Rating Agencies:
The State of Transparency and Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, I 08th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulations, SEC). It has
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further, however: a number of regulatory schemes have integrated
private credit assessments into their rubric. For example, the
streamlined purchase of securities by institutional investors is
conditioned upon an NRSRO rating of a certain level. 55 These so
called regulatory licenses 56 function in lieu of the public regulation of
security issuances to a certain strata of investors and serve to amplify
CRA opinions' utility in the public markets.
As complex securitization and multi-level derivative
transactions have become ever-more commonplace, information
asymmetries between issuers and investors have grown larger. This
has made investor reliance on the opinions of CRAs increasingly
cost-effective and efficient. It has also exaggerated CRAs' market
influence as well as the consequences of inaccurate pronouncements.
The huge sway CRAs have over activity in the financial markets has
made their present-day failures exceedingly conspicuous, thus
leading to calls for greater accountability. As the public seeks to
identify the villain in the current financial drama, credit rating
agencies got caught up in the chase and have recently been subject to
pervasive and widespread censure.

IV.

Rating Agencies' Points ofSystemic Failure

As the structured finance markets have increasingly relied
upon CRAs to correct extreme information asymmetries, their power
and influence has grown. The tremendous authority wielded by
CRAs in the market for securitized assets has revealed numerous
points of potential systemic failure inherent in CRAs' rating system.
This potential has been realized on a grand scale as a result of the
recent unprecedented stresses in the financial markets. In response,
been further alleged that "the largest rating agencies have abused their
dominant position by engaging in certain aggressive competitive practices."
Id These practices have included providing unsolicited ratings, thereby
forcing issuers to pay for ratings they did not request. ld
55
Partnoy, supra note 13, at 66 (arguing that that because of the
"regulations that depend exclusively on credit ratings issued by [NRSROs],"
economic rents are generated that persist, even in the face of inaccurate
ratings, when they would otherwise suffer from a decline in reputational
capital).
56
See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, II Oth Cong. 2 (Apr. 22, 2008) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Professor ofLaw) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Coffee].
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scholars, 57 the press, lawmakers, 58 and market participants have
called for reform: CRAs must not only be made accountable for their
ratings; they must also, going forward, be far more reliable.
A.

Independent Verification of Information and
Greater Transparency

Rating agencies have been criticized for not conducting
independent diligence in connection with their structured securities
rating analysis. 59 Exclusive reliance upon issuers and underwriters as
information sources leaves open the potential for the ratings
information inputs to be either biased or incomplete. 60 There is little
short-term incentive for issuers to completely disclose information
about all aspects of the underlying assets because selectively

57

See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert ofFinancial Markets?:
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619,
648-654 (1999); Partnoy, supra note 13, at 63-64, 72-73, 86-92 (criticizing
the quality and accuracy ofinfonnation provided by credit rating agencies).
58
See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization,
Securities Act Release No. 8570, Exchange Act Release No. 51,572,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,834, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306
(proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); COMMITTEE
OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, CESR's TECHNICAL ADVICE TO
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON POSSIBLE MEASURES CONCERNING CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES ~~ 154-192 (2004); Press Release, International
Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Releases Code of Conduct
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (Dec. 2004).
59
Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 9 ("[I]n the case of
structured fmance products . . . rating agencies do request and receive
information, but they do not audit, verity or even sample it. ... Put simply,
this is the equivalent of an auditor accepting an issuer's statements about its
revenues, costs, inventories and contingent liabilities at face value. Absent
some efforts at verification, it is doubtful that the ratings on structured
fmance will ever again be credible to much of the debt market.").
60
There is a special exemption in Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation
FD") for credit rating agencies: The issuer can selectively give information
to some rating agencies, and not others. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (2008)
("The third exclusion from coverage in Rule 1OO(b)(2) is for disclosures to
an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided
the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a credit
rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available.").
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choosing which information to provide may well increase an issuer's
credit rating. 61
Moreover, rating agencies have been criticized for the lack of
transparency with respect to the information utilized in arriving at a
rating, 62 as well as regarding their internal methodologies, processes,
and fee structure. 63 The lack of disclosure of fee structures and a lack
of transparency of ratings process in general has served to undermine
public confidence in their pronouncements. 64
B.

The Accuracy and Limitations of Quantitative
Models

As the market for asset-backed securities and derivative
products exploded, rating agencies endeavored to keep pace with the
increasing volume of issuances. In their efforts to identify and
capture risk, they developed new quantitative methods of rating the
increasingly exotic security issuances. These methods included the
design of complex models to ostensibly analyze, evaluate, and
determine the quality of the underlying assets' cash flows and thus
the securities' risk. 65
61

Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating
Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach 7, 33-34 (2005),
http://www .droitdesaffaires.org/pdf/enhancing.pdf.
62
Cf MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, INSIDE MOODY'S: CREDIT POLICY 2-11
(Apr.
2008),
http://v2.moodys.com/moodys/cust/content/content.ashx?
source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Credit%20Policy/CreditPolicy.pdf
(citing the increasing lack of confidence in credit ratings and explaining
how Moody's methods and models are designed to encourage transparency).
63
Rousseau, supra note 61, at 46-47.
64
See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS ASSOC., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION CREDIT
RATING AGENCY TASK FORCE 2-9 (2008), http://www.sifma.org/capital
_markets/docs/SIFMA-CRA-Recommendations.pdf (recommending that
CRAs disclose their rating methodology, the information they rely upon in
formulating their ratings, their surveillance procedures, and comparable
CRA performance so as to increase market confidence in their credit
ratings).
65
According to reports made in the early 1990s, this analysis involved a
review of the receivable pool's historic record in order to discard those
receivables perceived to be high risk. Jonathan E. Keighley, Risks in
Securitisation Transactions, in THE GLOBAL ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
MARKET: STRUCTURING, MANAGING AND ALLOCATING RISK 100-01
(Charles Stone et al. eds., 1993) (explaining steps to restructuring the
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A great deal of criticism has been leveled at the quantitative
66
models CRAs used to assess risk. The most pointed criticism is that
these models too often "got it wrong." This was either because too
much confidence was placed on numerical, objective analysis, or not
67
enough contextual attention was paid to these numerics.
originator's asset pool). Receivables with a history of late payment, an
origination from specific, less desirable industries or depressed geographical
regions, or from classes of less financially dependable obligors were
eliminated from the pool or required to be credit-enhanced. !d. Specific loss
probability parameters were set, and those receivables not falling within
these parameters, or not sufficiently credit enhanced, were eliminated from
the pool. !d. Before long, scientists and mathematicians developed statistical
tools for measuring and quantifying risk. The most commonly used model,
known as VaR (Value at Risk) measured "the boundaries of risk in a
portfolio over short durations, assuming a "normal market." The VaR
measurement appealed to investors because "it expresses risk as a single
number, a dollar figure, no less .... For instance, if you have $50 million of
weekly VaR, that means that over the course of the next week, there is a 99
percent chance that your portfolio won't lose more than $50 million." Joe
Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall
Street Trades Flawed? Or was the Mistake Ignoring Them?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., JAN. 4, 2009, at 24, 26.
66
See, e.g., Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 4 ("In
hindsight, it is now evident that the [quantitative] models used by the ratings
agencies to estimate the risk of loss on structured fmance products
(especially COOs) were flawed and inaccurate."); Nocera, supra note 65, at
26 ("Given the calamity that has since occurred, there has been a great deal
of talk, even in quant circles, that this widespread institutional reliance on
VaR was a terrible mistake.").
67
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in 2008
that
[t]he . . . surge in global demand for U.S. subprime
securities by banks, hedge, and pension funds supported
by unrealistically positive rating designations by credit
agencies was, in my judgment, the core of the problem.
Demand became so aggressive that too many securitizers
and lenders believed they were able to create and sell
mortgage backed securities so quickly that they never put
their shareholders' capital at risk and hence did not have
the incentive to evaluate the credit quality of what they
were selling. Pressures on lenders to supply more "paper"
collapsed subprime underwriting standards from 2005
forward. Uncritical acceptance of credit ratings by
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Moreover, the mathematical models commonly used reflected
risk based upon short-term, rather than long-term historical data. As
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in
his "mea culpa" testimony before a Congressional Oversight
Committee:
The whole intellectual edifice [underpinning the
advances in derivatives markets] ... collapsed in the
summer of last year because the data inputted into
the risk management models generally covered only
the past two decades, a period of euphoria. Had
instead the models been fitted more appropriately to
historic periods of stress, capital requirements would
have been much higher and the financial world
would be in far better shape today .... 68
Further, CRAs' quantitative models failed or were slow to
consider the impact of changed underwriting practices on the part of
front line lenders. Little, if any, scrutiny was made of the securitized
receivables and supporting collateral; as such, high loan to value
ratio loans ("HLTV loans": between 90% and 125%) and no
documentation loans (commonly known as "liar loans") were often
not reflected in the models' risk rating. 69 With no independent
verification conducted by rating agencies about the actual

purchasers of these toxic assets has led to huge losses. It
was the failure to properly price such risky assets that
precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk
management and pricing system has evolved, combining
the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts
supported by major advances in computer and
communications technology. A Nobel Prize was awarded
for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins
much of the advance in derivates markets. This modern
risk management paradigm held sway for decades.
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before
the Comm. of Government Oversight and Reform, llOth Cong. 3 (2008)
(testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve).
68
!d. at 3-4.
69
See Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 7.
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underwriting standards employed, the quantitative analysis of risk
failed to factor in this data. 70
In addition, the quantitative risks assessment models failed to
take into account what is known as "default dependence" or "default
contagion." 71 A default is "dependent" or "contagious" when
conditions are such that a default by one borrower increases the
default probability of other borrowers. 72 For example, the stress
experienced by the subprime mortgage market rapidly spread to other
financial sectors. 73 As the current economic environment is
demonstrating, risk can be both interconnected and contagious? 4
Finally, the limitations inherent in any quantitative modeling
tool were not fully recognized by the credit analysts ultimately
responsible for rating the MBSs, ABSs and derivatives. 75 Over
70

See id. at 9.
I d. at 4.
72
See id.
73
Moody's stated that
71

[c ]red it problems initially localized in subprime US
mortgages quickly spread to other complex financial
vehicles with subprime exposure and triggered a broad
repricing of risk. This affected not only a variety of
fmancial vehicles holding subprime paper . . . but also
bled into other asset classes, such as Alt-A mortgages,
commercial mortgages, leveraged loans, covered bonds,
the corporate sector more generally, and, prospectively,
credit card securitizations.
MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 62, at 7.
See id. at 7-8.
75
The following observation was attributed to Nassim Nicholas Taleb,
Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University:
74

Wall street risk models, no matter how mathematically
sophisticated, are bogus; ... the essential reason for this is
that the greatest risks are never the ones you can see and
measure, but the ones you can't see and therefore can
never measure. The ones that seem so far outside the
boundary of normal probability that you can't imagine
they could happen in your lifetime-even though, of
course, they do happen, more often than you care to
realize. Devastating hurricanes happen. Earthquakes
happen. And once in a great while, huge fmancial
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reliance on "math" to the exclusion of consideration of subjective
factors impacting credit quality such as the issuer's management
quality, competitive market position, financial policy, capital
structure, cash flow protection, accounting practices, and the general
economic environment led to inaccurate conclusions about levels of
risk. 76 Analysts cast aside their judgment in favor of the illusion of an
objective risk numerical. 77
catastrophes happen. Catastrophes that risk models
somehow always manage to miss.
Nocera, supra note 65, at 28 (quoting Professor Taleb).
76
The SEC report on credit ratings agencies describing the general
procedures CRAs use in rating issuers, additionally noted that
[t]he primary credit considerations used in the corporate
fmance area involve both non-fmancial and financial
factors. Some of the non-fmancial or qualitative
considerations include: (I) stability of markets, (2)
diversity of markets, (3) efficiency of operation (e.g.,
distribution system and operating margins), (4) peer group
analysis, (5) competition and market positions, and (6)
government regulation. Financial or quantitative
considerations include: (1) cash generation or use, (2)
balance sheet strength, (3) debt/capitalization ratios, (4)
interest coverage ratios, (5) operating cash flow to total
debt ratios, and (6) fixed charge ratios.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., supra note 18, at 25 n.64, 25-27.
Professor Coffee stated that

77

[t]he real purpose and point of this proposal is to
supplement the quantitative model of the rating agency
with some minimal auditing (or at least sampling) that
tests the quality of the information that the rating agency
is relying upon. Otherwise, the oldest rule about
quantitative models is "GIGO"-garbage in, garbage out.
In effect, this proposal seeks to invent a new gatekeeper to
complement the role of the rating agency because, in the
world of structured finance, the rating agency is flying
blind. Worse yet, because rating agencies commonly
provide issuers and underwriters with their quantitative
models, the latter know precisely how to "game the
model" with only slightly misleading information to
produce the desired result.
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Conflicts of Interest

The most oft-cited criticism of CRAs grows out of their
practice of having issuers pay for their own ratings, thus creating a
potentially corrupting conflict of interest. 78 Such a system leaves
open the temptation for CRAs to modulate their opinion as to the
credit risk of securities issued by repeat issuers. 79 Because issuers of
securities-who are rationally seeking the highest possible ratings
for the lowest possible cost of issuance-are also the parties paying
CRAs to issue the ratings, this arrangement has the potential to skew
the outcome of the rating process. If the rating agency's opinion is
based on a faulty factual foundation, or one that is arrived at in the
context of conflicting interests, its value is lost, and the system loses
its efficiency. In light of the fact that structured finance transactions
have accounted for approximately 40 percent of CRA's revenues, 80
and most of the business originates from the finite investment
banking community, this concern may be well placed. 81
Moreover, the emergence of CRA consulting divisions
offering risk-assessment services to issuers presents further potential

Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 12.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("We defme an agency relationship as a contract
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.").
79
U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 41 ("The practice of issuers
paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of interest.
Arguably, the dependence of rating agencies on revenues from the
companies they rate could induce them to rate issuers more liberally, and
temper their diligence in probing for negative information."). Moody's,
S&P, and Fitch all offer customized credit risk management services and
quantitative tools through their ancillary business divisions.
80
See Portnoy, supra note 13, at 60, 62-69 (describing the CRAs' revenue
structure).
81
See generally Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Examinations Find Shortcomings in Credit Rating Agencies' Practices and
8,
2008)
(available
at
Disclosure
to
Investors
(July
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-135.htm) ("[S]ignificant aspects
of the rating process were not always disclosed or even documented by the
firms, and conflicts of interest were not always managed appropriately.").
78
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for conflicts of interests. 82 This is tantamount to the criticism leveled
at accounting and law firms for offering ancillary consulting
services: services offered by such ancillary businesses present the
risk of compromising the validity of professional opinions. 83 If a
CRA is both selling issuer models (analytics and data for the purpose
of designing or improving its internal risk systems) as well as rating
such issuer, that CRA is "highly unlikely to downgrade [that issuer's]
risk capabilities if [that issuer] has bought one of [the CRA's] risk
systems. " 84
V.

Responses to the Public Failure
A.

Self-Regulation by NRSROs

In response to the public pillory and the demands for greater
accountability and transparency, each NRSRO has recently released
what may be seen as "self-assessments" or critiques of their
practices. These reports, likely published as part of an effort to avoid
being subject to an onerous regulatory framework, explicitly outlines
their points of systemic failure. 85 Framed as prescriptions for these
82

See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM., supra note 18, at 42.
!d. at n.ll7.
84
Chris Marrison & Howard Radley, A Risky New Role for the Rating
Agencies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at 19.
85
FITCH RATINGS, FITCH RATINGS CODE OF CONDUCT 1-17 (2009),
http://www .fitchratings.com/web_ content/credit_policy/code_of_conduct.p
df; MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, REPORT ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 4-17 (2009), http://www.moodys.com (follow "Code of
Professional Conduct" hyperlink; then follow "Report on the Code of
Professional Conduct-2008" hyperlink); MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE,
INSIDE MOODY'S: CREDIT POLICY, supra note 73; STANDARD & POOR'S,
STANDARD & POOR'S REVISES ITS APPROACH TO RATING SPECULATIVE
GRADE CREDIT 3 (2008), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/
media/leadership_actions_ratings_051308.pdf; STANDARD & POOR'S,
WHAT STANDARD & POOR'S IS DOING TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND
INFORMATION TO ENHANCE U.S. RMBS RATINGS 2-6 (2008)
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime_ rmbs_ 050508.
pdf; see also Press Release, Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Investors
Service Updates its Code of Professional Conduct (Nov. 20, 2008) available
at
http://www.iminers.com/render.php?eid=116842583&symboi=MCO&
whichmodule=pressroom; Press Release, Moody's Investors Service,
Moody's Analytics Adds Comprehensive Credit Risk Measures to its Credit
Quotes Pricing and Valuations Service (Oct. 16, 2008) available at
8'
J
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recent failures, the reports set forth a litany of voluntary policy
changes to the processes used to rate ABSs, MBSs, and derivative
86
products. They each address an array of issues, including a lack of
transparency concerning data and operations, inaccurate quantitative
87
modeling, and the potential for conflicting loyalties.
88
To illustrate, each NRSRO has adopted internal policies
that require analysts to conduct a qualitative review of all loan
originators, including an assessment of each originator's
http://www.iminers.com/render.php?eid=115055943&symboi=MCO&whic
hmodu le=pressroom.
86
See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY
STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008), available at
http://www. ustreas. gov /press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmo il_03
122008.pdf ("[I]t seems clear from experience to date that the principal
underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets were: ... a significant
erosion of market discipline by those involved in the securitization process,
including ... credit rating agencies ... [and] flaws in credit rating agencies'
assessments ...."); see also Standard & Poor's, S&P's Views of Current
Developments in the Financial Markets, http://www.spviews.com/ (last
visited on Apr. 5, 2009) ("Recently there has been much public discussion
around credit rating agencies and problems in the subprime mortgage
market. As the foremost provider of credit ratings, Standard & Poor's []
believes it is important that any dialogue about credit ratings be based on
accurate information about how credit ratings agencies work and how
ratings are used. This special section of our website has been designed to
give readers a better understanding of the role S&P's ratings play in capital
markets; the thoroughness, transparency and integrity of our approach; and
the rigor of our decision-making processes.").
87
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 86,
at 1-2, 8-10 (identifying the principal underlying causes of the recent turmoil
in the financial markets, including many CRA failings).
88
Whereas analysts rating corporate bonds rely largely on publicly available
information (such as audited financial statements and public disclosure
filings), prior to the effective date of Moody's criteria to be applied to rating
MBSs, information about the receivable and underlying collateral came
directly from the issuer or underwriter. Statement of Professor Coffee, supra
note 56, at 9 (stating that CRAs "accept the representations and data
provided by issuers, loan originators, and underwriters at face value and
without undertaking any real effort to verify."). There was little or no
independent due diligence prior to a CRA issuing a rating. !d. ("To be sure,
ratings agencies do request and receive information, but they do not audit,
verify or even sample it. Put simply, this is the equivalent of an auditor
accepting an issuer's statements about its revenues, costs, inventories and
contingent liabilities at face value.").
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underwriting policies and procedures, property valuation procedures,
closing and funding procedures, an evaluation of third party
originators (meaning mortgage brokers), credit risk management
processes, originator financial stability, quality control and audit
procedures, legal and regulatory compliance, and a review of
originators' technology. 89 In addition, in some cases, a third party
must be engaged to conduct diligence on MBSs & ABSs to
complement the role of rating agencies. 90
Moreover, given the extent to which CRAs relied upon
quantitative models to analyze the risk associated with increasingly
complex structured securities, each NSRO has enacted new internal
policies to try to address the shortfalls and limitations inherent in
their quantitative modeling. For example, a "responsible party" has
been deputized to review the methodologies and models used in the
rating process. 91 As Moody's Credit Policy publication describes it:
89

See, e.g., KATHRYN KELBAUGH, MOODY'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE,
MOODY'S ENHANCED APPROACH TO ORIGINATOR ASSESSMENTS FOR U.S.
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 1-2 (2008) ("[O]riginator
ability factors include (a) sales and marketing practices (b) consistency in
underwriting loans within prescribed underwriting guidelines (c) property
valuation management practices, policies and procedures ... closing and
post closing policies and practices including lien perfection procedures (d)
management of brokers and correspondents (e) credit risk management. ...
Key attributes of originator stability include fmancial strength, management
strength, staff quality, quality control, internal audit, technology and other
support functions that lead to operational stability.").
90
See, e.g., id. at 2 ("Finally, Moody's will seek to review the results of the
third-party pre-securitization loan-level review for each transaction . . .
whether the transaction was rated by Moody's or not."). In addition, the
issue of a lack of diligence as to the financial integrity of credit
enhancement providers has been a key concern. As the highly publicized
insolvency of a number of mainline providers of credit enhancement has
demonstrated, CRAs' reliance on such insurers was misplaced. Apparently,
the capitalization of these backstop insurers of ABSs, MBS, and CDOs was
not fully considered by rating analysts in arriving at their risk ratings.
91
See, e.g., Progress Update, Standard & Poor's, S&P's Steps to Further
Manage Potential Conflicts of Interest, Strengthen the Ratings Process, and
Better Serve the Market (Apr. I0, 2008), available at http://www2.
standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Leadership_Actions_Full_ Update.pdf
(describing the changes S&P has made in its governance, analytics,
information and education and stating that "[S&P has] hired a Senior
Director of Model Quality and [has] staffed and established the group.");
S&P's Leadership Actions, http://www.spnewactions.com/documentation/
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Methodologies and models are simplifications of
reality that focus on key credit factors and
interaction but necessarily omit many more. They
encourage rating consistency and transparency, but
their output is far from definitive; the output in fact
is used as an input itself into the final rating
decision. Proper use of a model or scorecard
includes a sophisticated understanding of its
limitations. The "indicated rating" from a model is a
starting point for rating committee discussion but
always supplemented with some combination of
additional information, ratios and statistics, and
qualitative judgment, which may justifY assigning a
rating higher or lower than the modeled output. 92
Apparently addressing the perceived dangers inherent in over
reliance on a numerical output, Moody's has also vowed to "focus
intensively on how risks interconnect, on the sometimes sharp
increase in correlations and contagion across markets, and on sources
of systemic instability. " 93
Finally, as part of the CRAs' voluntary response to the
expressed concern about conflicts of interest, they have explicitly
outlined the organizational divisions between credit analysts and
business development staffs. 94 They further claim that there will be
index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (stating that S&P will "[e ]stablish a
Model Oversight Committee within the Quantitative Analytics Group,
which will be separate from and independent of the business unit, to assess
and validate the quality of data and models used in our analytical
processes.").
92
MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 62, at 5.
93
!d. at7-8.
94
S&P has outlined specific initiatives, including hiring an ombudsman and
demanding disclosure of collateral by originators in structured-finance
securities; plans to reduce conflicts of interest through measures such as
preventing analysts from covering issuers for more than five years. Progress
Update, Standard & Poor's, supra note 91. "Moody's has separated its
credit-ratings operations from its marketing and analytics and Fitch is
reassessing the way it grades certain types of debt." Karen Freifeld,
Moody's, S&P Reach Settlement Agreement With Cuomo, People Say,
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20601087&sid=azlGhfhVz3JU&refer=home;
see
also
MOODY'S
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no relationship between credit analysts' compensation and future
business development. 95 Moreover, the rating agencies' ancillary
services divisions will be firewalled from the divisions conducting
.
the ratmgs
ana1yses. 96
B.

The SEC Amendments and Proposals

The adoption and publication of these self-enforcing policies
by the NRSROs, however, did not result in a completely successful
dodge of the regulatory bullet. On February 2, 2009, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission")
released new rules governing certain aspects of the conduct of
NRSROs in their rating of structured securities and other related debt
instruments. 97 According to the SEC's release, these new
requirements are intended to "address concerns about the integrity of
. . . credit rating procedures and methodologies," 98 as well as
"increase the transparency of the NRSROs' rating methodologies,
strengthen the NRSROs' disclosure of ratings performance, prohibit
the NRSROs from engaging in certain practices that create conflicts
of interest, and enhance the NRSROs' recordkeeping and reporting
obligations to assist the Commission in performing its regulatory and
oversight functions. " 99
The SEC rule amendments, the product of much negotiation
and compromise, require that NRSROs provide improved disclosure
of information upon which ratings are based, as well as disclosure of
"performance measurements statistics and the procedures and
methodologies." 10 For example, CRAs are prohibited from issuing a

°

INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S CREDIT POLICY: STRENGTHENING
ANALYTICAL QUALITY AND TRANSPARENCY 6-7 (Aug. 2008).
95
See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 94, at 7 ("Analysts
are not compensated on the basis of the financial performance of their
business unit or on the fees derived from the ratings that they oversee.").
96
See, e.g., id. ("Moody's has separated all non-rating services from the
credit rating agency.").
97
Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 59,342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456 (Apr.
10, 2009).
98
99

ld.
!d. at 6,456-57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009).

100

Specifically, the instructions require an NRSRO to provide descriptions
of the following areas (as applicable): policies for determining whether to
initiate a credit rating; sources of information used in determining credit
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rating on a structured product unless information about the
underlying assets is made available. 101 Moreover, all of an agency's
ratings and subsequent rating actions must be made publicly
available, although the CRAs fought for and received a six-month lag
time for the release of such information. 102 Performance statistics
must also be published for one, three, and ten years within each
rating category, as must information about how frequently credit
ratings are reviewed. 103 In addition, the amendments addressed the
issue of conflicts of interest by prohibiting CRAs from structuring
the same financial products that they rate, and by separating the fee
negotiation from the rating process.
The SEC, however, tabled a number of proposed measures in
an effort to collect further public comment. These measures include a
requirement that NRSROs to publicly disclose the specific
information they used to arrive at or to monitor the rating of
structured securities. The proposal requires (i) the NRSRO to
disclose to other NRSROs that it was rating the security; (ii) the
issuer, sponsor or underwriter to represent that it was giving the same
information to the other NRSROs in order for them to determine a
rating, and (iii) NRSROs to certify annually how it is using the
information they seek and receive with respect to structured finance
products from other NRSROs. These proposed rules would apply
when an issuer, sponsor, or underwriter hires an NRSRO to rate a
structured finance product. Other proposals still out for further public
comment include changes in the rating symbols for structured
ratings; the models and metrics used to determine credit ratings; policies for
using credit ratings of other agencies in determining credit ratings for
securities or money market instruments; procedures for interacting with the
management of a rated obligor or issuer; the structure and voting process of
credit ratings committee; procedures for informing rated obligors or issuers
about credit rating decisions and for appeals of final or pending rating
decisions; procedures for reviewing credit ratings; and procedures to
suspend the maintenance of a credit rating. 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456 n.34.
101
!d. at n.l84.
102
The time lag was, according to the SEC, a response to concerns about
loss of revenues that NRSROs earn from selling their data packages. The
SEC is still considering how to improve public disclosure on subscriber paid
credit ratings. !d. at 6,462.
106
NRSROs must publish a random sample of 10 percent of the ratings
histories paid credit ratings "in each class of credit ratings for which it is
registered and has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings." New
ratings should be reflected in the sample within six months. !d. at 6,469.
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finance products and amendments designed to reduce SEC rule
reliance on NRSRO ratings.
C.

The New York Attorney General's Settlement

The "voluntary" reforms 104 followed on the heels of an
extensive investigation of credit rating agency practices with respect
to residential mortgage-backed securities conducted by the New
York Office of the Attorney General, under the supervision of the
Investor Protection Bureau chief. This investigation concluded with a
settlement agreement dated as of June 2008 pursuant to which each
NRSRO agreed to implement a number of reforms to their rating of
residential mortgage-backed securities. 105 In accord with the terms
of the settlement, NRSROs are required to (i) establish a fee-for
service structure, whereby rating agencies will be compensated for
determining a rating, regardless of whether they are ultimately hired
to deliver the rating; (ii) disclose information about all mortgage
backed securitizations submitted by investment banks for initial
review, so investors are able to determine whether issuers sought any
rating they ultimately decided not to use; (iii) establish criteria for the
review of mortgage loan originators and their lending processes, and
publicly disclose such information; (iv) establish criteria for the
collection of information about the mortgages backing the rated
MBSs, and publicly disclose such information; (v) conduct an annual
self-critique of their residential mortgage-backed securities rating
practices, to identity and remediate practices that could compromise
their independent opinions; and (vi) require that investment banks
and other financially responsible parties provide representations and
warranties with respect to the loans underlying rated residential
mortgage-backed securities. 106

VI.

The Opportunity in the Rating Agency Crisis

It is popularly understood that the Chinese word "fl2:f~"
translated as "crisis," is composed of two characters: one for

104

See Part V.A, supra.
Press Release, Office ofthe Attorney General ofthe State ofNew York,
Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark Reform Agreements with
the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008).
106 !d.
105
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"danger" and one for "opportunity." 107 Crisis provides the chance for
change and growth-which is the opportunity. Periods of crisis may,
however, lead some to experience the risk of regression, stagnation,
or even obsolescence-the danger. The translation of these two
component characters offers a concise description of the two
pathways currently open to credit rating agencies.
The voluntary measures adopted by the rating agencies, the
SEC's recently-adopted amendments, the proposed rules, and the
terms of the Attorney General's settlement address many of the
points of central concern that have surfaced in the recent market
turmoil. However, they do so in a piecemeal, fragmented fashion:
they were developed reactively, not proactively, and it shows. A
comprehensive reform of the regulatory landscape is called for.
Any reform initiative must be measured by how robustly
three central objectives are met: (i) increasing the reliability and
accuracy of ratings of MBSs, ABSs, and derivative securities; (ii)
increasing competition within the market in which rating agencies
operate and decreasing incentives for behavior that implicates
conflicting interests and loyalties; and (iii) enhancing market
107

The earliest citations found by linguist and lexographer Benjamin
Zimmer, Research Associate, Institute for Research in Cognitive Science,
University of Pennsylvania, were published in the Chinese Recorder, an
English-language newspaper for missionaries in China. In January, 1938, an
unsigned editorial entitled "The Challenge of Unusual Times" read:
The Chinese term for crisis is "danger-opportunity"

(!Btl). Without the danger there cannot arise the
opportunity. It is very fitting then that in this time of
"danger-opportunity" there should go forth a call to a
Forward Movement in the Christian Church in China.
Benjamin Zimmer, Crisis = Danger + Opportunity: The Plot Thickens,
LANGUAGE LOG, Mar. 27, 2007, http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/
archives/004343.html (citing The Challenge of Unusual Times, LXIX
CHINESE RECORDER 2 (1938)). Professor Zimmer observes that this
translation is not without its detractors. See Victor H. Mair, Danger +
Opportunity t- Crisis: How a Misunderstanding About Chinese Characters
Has Led Many Astray, Plnyln.info, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/
crisis.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) ("There is a widespread
misperception, particularly among the New Age sector, that the Chinese
word for 'crisis' is composed of elements that signify 'danger' and
'opportunity.'").
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transparency, 108 thereby offering means for investors to conduct
independent diligence ofMBSs', ABSs', and CDOs' credit quality in
order to decrease exclusive reliance on rating agency opinions.
One way of ensuring these objectives are met going forward
is to require CRAs to have far greater accountability. An independent
and expert oversight board must be created, with the authority and
funding to comprehensively oversee the rating process. Moreover,
specific penalties must be built into the internal or external regulatory
structure for getting a rating wrong. Penalties, such as the loss of
NRSRO status if default rate of rated securities exceeded certain
specified levels, or the forfeiture of a fee if a default rate exceeds
certain benchmarks, 109 would alter the culture and behavior in the
current system. Lifting the exemption from civil liability for
negligent, reckless, or fraudulent behavior would go even further and
put rating agencies on an equal footing with other players in the
financial markets.
The financial crisis may be partly attributed to a failure of
imagination-no one in the financial markets or in government ever
thought that market conditions could get this bad. Rating agencies
also suffered from a failure of imagination. Going forward, analysts
must now ask the "what if?" question in order to factor in to risk
assessments what is essentially the unknown.
Of course, in order to dig completely out of the current MBS,
ABS, and CDO-rooted crisis, policy and regulatory reforms must not
be limited to rating agencies; fundamental measures must be put in
place to alter the incentives driving all the participants in the
financial markets. Securitizing originators must be required to retain
a significant portion of the securities they originate. In this way,
credit-underwriting risk is shared, and not simply transferred.
Disclosure and oversight of derivative transactions, including credit
default swaps, must be regulated, if at all, under federal securities
108

See, e.g., Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Remarks for Deven Sharma,
FDIC Conference 16-17 (Jul. 9, 2008), available at http://www2.standard
andpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Sharma_FDIC_Final. pdf) ("While the wide
range of structured finance products-think COOs of ABS, ABCP conduits,
or HELOCs-have found eager buyers, it also appears that not all of these
buyers fully understood what they were buying. Due diligence is, of course,
ultimately the responsibility of the investor. But I also believe that the
issuers have a responsibility to be transparent regarding the risks associated
with the assets they are securitizing.").
109
Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 14.
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laws and not simply by state insurance statutes. Moreover, pricing
models for mortgage- and asset-backed securities must more
accurately reflect the market reality that cash flows and the value of
collateral, including real estate, cyclically fall-as well as rise.
CRAs must resist re-entering the race to the bottom in search
of extraordinary short-term profits. Moreover, they must make an
effort to alter market norms so that there is a return to the idea that a
rating is a valuable complement to, and not a proxy for, an investor's
own due diligence. 110 In the past, rating agencies disclaimed that to
be the case, while at the same time they contributed to the culture of
absolute reliance on their opinions.
Given the adverse position in which rating agencies find
themselves-what may fairly be categorized as an abyss-this
moment is ripe for consideration of how they can avoid getting
ensnared in blinding market bubbles in the future. Every assumption,
process, and methodology employed must be questioned and
examined. We have to look at the issue of regulation (both self
imposed and external) differently. We must spend more time
imagining future scenarios and less time relying on information from
the past. The question becomes, "How do we make certain that this
moment is tantamount to 'the storm of the century,' rather than
simply a dip in the future cycle of extreme booms and busts?"

VIL

Conclusion

Credit rating agencies' faulty and inadequate pricing and risk
assessments have had catastrophic and wide-ranging systemic
effects. One of the consequences of the 2008-2009 financial crisis
has been the decimation of rating agencies' reputational capita-the
most valuable assets they have. Their credibility in the market must
be re-established and their integrity restored in order to regain
investors' and the public's confidence in their opinions. Their
behavior and role in the markets must be dramatically re-imagined.
We now have the opportunity to address CRAs role in the financial
crisis and attend to their deficiencies in process, methodology and
policy. CRAs will either support a more robust regulatory
infrastructure and dramatic modification of their practice and emerge
from the ashes, or they will become irrelevant. The question that
110

See generally id. at 15 ("[R]atings speak to credit risk, and credit risk
only. They don't talk to suitability, price, duration or any of the myriad of
other factors investors need to look at before buying a security.").
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remains, however, is whether the 2008-2009 financial crisis will
serve as an opportunity for genuine and meaningful reform for the
credit rating agencies, lll or, will it result in the regression,
stagnation, and the ultimate obsolescence of CRAs?

111

It has been said that it is difficult to predict an event not yet experienced.
The 2008-2009 financial crisis is (we hope) a once in a lifetime event.

